Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp, **Francisco Suárez on the Intentional Species**

Abstract: With his notion of the intentional species, Francisco Suárez reevaluates the role of causality within a realist theory of knowledge. Taking into account various traditional accounts, e.g. Avicenna's, Aquinas's and Durandus's, he develops a novel approach according to which the accidental features of material objects are necessary, though not sufficient causes for knowledge. In rejecting the Aristotelian claim that cognitive processes are passive, he thinks that knowing is essentially an active reaching out to the objects known. His interpretation of causality in cognitive processes also leads him not only to reassess the mind-world-relation, but also to advance a theory as to how higher and lower cognitive capacities are intertwined. The dependency of the higher ones, such as the intellect, on perceptual processes requires to accommodate the traditional dictum that lower entities do not cause essential effects in higher ones. Hence Suárez stresses the intrinsic congruence (*sympathia*, *harmonia*) of all cognitive powers on a rather non-causal footing.

Key words: Intentional Species; Realism; Perception; Inner Senses; Intellect; Causality; Attention; Activity and Passivity of the Senses.

Francesco Marrone, **Ontologia dei contenuti ideali. Essere oggettivo e realtà nel dibattito Descartes-Caterus**

Abstract: The point of departure of this paper is a critical reconsideration of the debate on the concept of *realitas obiectiva* in the *First Objections* and *Replies* in Descartes's *Meditations on First Philosophy*. The aim of the paper is, on the one side, to stress the role played by Descartes in the formulation of the modern concept of 'reality' and, on the other side, to inquire into the role that the Cartesian thought could have played in the historical formulation of the concept of intentionality too. Moving from this general perspective, the paper offers a description of the *ontology of the ideal contents* given by Descartes in his *Meditations*; then, it tries to clarify the relationship between this ontology and the doctrine of the intentionality; finally, it proposes an overall interpretation of the fundamental debate between Descartes and Caterus. The point is that the Cartesian doctrine of the *realitas obiectiva* marked a decisive step in the long history of the intentionality in so far as it stimulated a reflection on the 'reality' of the intentional objects considered as contained in the ideas.

Key words: Objective Being; Descartes; Caterus; Intentionality; Objective Reality; Reality; Idea; Mental Content; Extrinsic Denomination; Nothing; Causality; Ontology.

Giovanna D'Aniello, **L'*intentio animi* nella sintesi agostiniana di Cornelis Jansen**

Abstract: Aim of this article is to elucidate Jansenius' notion of intentionality as rooted in his Augustinian-minded account of the dynamics of knowledge, action, and love.
First of all, an essential overview of the semantics of intentionality in Augustine shows that the term *intentio* might cover either a cognitive or a moral sphere: in both senses, however, it represents an activity of the soul, so that even the perception is conceived as a form of "attention" toward the modifications of the sense data. Secondly, the topic of *intentio animi* is analysed in Jansenius' both philosophical and exegetical works, whereby he seems to exclusively understand intentionality in a rather practical sense, i.e. as the inner tendency of the will. Intention is the core of affective and moral life, whose dynamic arises from the heart.
In his lectures on *Tetrateuchus* and *Pentateuchus* Jansenius focuses on the love-command that has been laid down by divine authority: "You shall love God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind", meaning that you are to concentrate all your thoughts, your whole life and your whole intelligence upon God. An object, thus, worthy of love is to be borne into the same channel in which the whole current of our affections flows.
Later in *Augustinus* Jansenius argues that God is the ultimate goal of human beings, whose affections are to be entirely fixed upon Him. However, a further distinction of goals – which is lacking in Augustine – hereby rather splits the unique direction of God as the highest and ultimate object of human affection. Moreover, Jansenius seems to conduct a campaign against both self-love and love of neighbour, if not referred to God in a rightly ordered affection: love, thus, is to be detached from any creatures – who might only be used – and turned into the Creator, in order to give room to the real and proper object of love for its own sake, i.e. enjoyment.

Keywords: Jansenius; Intentionality; Augustinian-minded Exegesis; Order of Love; Ultimate Goal.

Martin Lenz, **Locke's Theory of Ideas and the Myth of the Given**

Abstract: In the wake of Wilfrid Sellars' philosophy, John Locke's theory of ideas is often taken to fall prey to the so-called Myth of the Given. The main charge is that Locke appeals to passively received sense impressions to justify knowledge claims and ultimately confuses natural processes with normative conceptual activity. In this paper, I will argue that the accusations are founded on a faulty reading and that Locke's account does indeed circumvent Givenism without having to abandon the foundationalist ambitions that drive his theory of ideas. I will begin by exploring the attractions and pitfalls of the Myth. Secondly, I will show how the Sellarsian objections can be launched against Locke's theory of ideas. Thirdly, I will present my interpretation of Locke's take on ideas and show how they fare in relation to the crucial features involved in the discussion of the Myth. By way of conclusion, I will discuss whether Locke's way of avoiding the Myth limits his foundationalist approach.

Keywords: Ideas; Myth of the Given; Locke; Sellars.

Alain de Libera, L'Ouverture écossaise : Brentano critique de Bain

Abstract: Brentano's relationship to Alexander Bain has so far received little attention. The first part of this paper argues that the basic tenets of the so-called *Intentionality thesis* should be considered as systematically opposed to a complex of principles borrowed by Brentano from two major works by the scottish philosopher and psychologist: *The Senses and the Intellect* and the *'Compendium' on Mental and Moral Science*. Bain's doctrine is based on two sets of claims: T1 (1) There is only a negative definition of Mind: a definition "by contrast" as the "unextended"; (2) There is a small number of general properties, whose divison under "three heads" is all that can be offered as a positive definition of Mind; those heads are *Feeling, Volition, Thought* or *Cognition*. T2 (1) There is no one fact or property that embraces all the three; (2) the three classes of mental phenomena do not imply each other. Brentano's reply is based on the very opposite claims: *T1 (1) there are several negative definitions of mind, all questionable, but there is (1.2) a positive definition of Mind, that is well-grounded and not subjected to further criticisms; (2) the division of mental phenomena must be restated on this new positive basis; the new "heads" of the new division are: *Presentation, Judgement* and *Feeling*. *T2 (1) there is one common property that does characterize every mental phenomenon (§ 5): *Intentional In-existence*; (2) the phenomena of the three fundamental classes are most intimately "intertwined"; "there is no mental act in which all three are not present". The second part of the paper discusses at length Brentano's criticism of Bain's theory of volition as a feeling-prompted activity.

Key words: Alexander Bain; Augustine; Charles Renouvier; Emotion; Feeling; Intentionality; Judgement; Mental Activities; Mental Phenomenon; Mental Prompted Activities; Mind; Philosophy of Common Sense; Psychology; Scottish Philosophy; Volition; William Hamilton.

Donatella Colantuono, Conoscenza della realtà e realtà come conoscenza. Il punto di vista di Bernard Bolzano

Abstract: In this paper I explore some of the most important aspects of Bolzano's logical and gnoseological theory. Bolzano's basic logical notion of *Satz an sich* (proposition in itself) seems to lead him to a sort of Platonism. Contrary to what is often assumed, I attempt to demonstrate that Bolzano is not a realist, by showing that propositions in themselves are not real objects. In a second part of this paper, I analyze Bolzano's point of view about nature and function of logical entities, their relation to psychology and their respective role within the theory of knowledge.

Key words: Bernard Bolzano; Logic; Knowledge; Objective; Subjective; Truth; Reality; Mind.

Laurent Cesalli / Hamid Taieb, The Road to *ideelle Verähnlichung*. Anton Marty's Conception of Intentionality in the Light of its Brentanian Background

Abstract: Anton Marty (1847-1914) is known to be the most faithful pupil of Franz Brentano. As a matter of fact, most of his philosophical ideas find their source in the works of his master. Yet, the faithfulness of Marty is not constant. As the rich correspondence between the two thinkers shows, Marty elaborates an original theory of intentionality from ca. 1904 onward. This theory is based on the idea that intentionality is a process of mental assimilation (*ideelle Verähnlichung*), a process at the core of which lies a *sui generis* relation of "ideal similitude" holding between a thinking subject and its object. This study spells out the Martyian notion of mental assimilation and traces back Marty's evolution from his earlier position (prominently described in the recently published *Deskriptive Psychologie* of 1893-1894) to his final view as it is found in the *Untersuchungen* of 1908. It turns out that besides Brentano, Husserl is a key figure in that evolution. Such a "genetic" elucidation of Marty's last theory is required in order to reach the main goal of this paper, namely: the clarification of Marty's degree of dependence upon Brentano with respect to the theory of intentionality. That being said, we do not merely intend to compare the mature Marty with Brentano: our "genetic" considerations will also allow us to describe the interaction between the two thinkers before 1904. Accordingly, we begin by presenting Brentano's own position on intentionality in discussing its two currently competing readings, namely the "discontinuist" and the "continuist" one. Against a recent interpretation, we argue that Marty's endorsement of a "discontinuist" reading is not based on a misunderstanding of Brentano's position.

Key words: Anton Marty; Franz Brentano; Intentionality; Intentional Object; Relation; Relative Determination; Similitude.

Mauro Antonelli, Thoughts Concerning Anton Marty's Early Conception of Intentionality. Was He Thinking what Brentano Was Thinking?

Abstract: The paper focuses on a specific point addressed in the previous article of L. Cesalli and H. Taieb *The road to "ideelle Verähnlichung"*, namely, the correctness of Marty's interpretation of the early (pre-reistic) Brentanian conception of intentionality. Moving from the distinction between immanent (or intentional) object and intentional correlate, as developed by Brentano in his lectures on Descriptive Psychology, and referring to Aristotelian theory of *relativa*, which Brentano always remained faithful to, I show that Marty interpreted Brentano's early conception of intentionality in an immanentistic sense. Thus, the foundations for the so-called 'ontological' or 'discontinuist view' of Brentano's intentionality thesis were put down, and through the exegesis of his pupils and Brentano's *Enkelschüler* Kastil and Kraus it was then passed on, from generation to generation, until the present day.

Key words: Anton Marty; Franz Brentano; Intentionality; Intentional Object; Intentional Correlate; Relation.

Pierre-Jean Renaudie, **Le réel et ses signes : Brentano et Husserl sur l'engagement ontologique de l'intentionnalité**

Abstract: In spite of Brentano's considerable influence on Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, their analysis of intentionality is significatively different regarding some fundamental points, such as the status of reality, the nature of intentional acts, and their relation to the world. The core of the opposition between Brentano and Husserl is to be found in the ontological background of their theories, as a result of which they hold two different approaches of the existential import of intentionality. This paper investigates those differences in order to ask whether a relational understanding of intentionality is likely to give a satisfying account of reality. Both Brentano and Husserl's analyses provide important clues regarding this issue and stress the main difficulties of the question, even if their theories fail to take into consideration the actual insertion of intentional acts within the world.

Key words: Brentano; Husserl; Intentionality; Representation; Reality; Ontological Import; World; Psychology.

Carmine Di Martino, **Husserl: intenzionalità *versus* realismo?**

Abstract: Many contemporary theoretical perspectives – whether internal to the phenomenological tradition or not – endorse, more o less explicitly, a realistic and anti-phenomenological stance. The issue at stake is, precisely, the question of "reality". Many of these authors interpret the notion of intentionality, and therefore phenomenology, in an idealistic sense, in continuity with modern, and especially Kantian, philosophy. The heart of the matter lies in the topic of «constitution» and in the operative (constituent) character of intentionality. Whether our object of inquiry is a transcendent thing (a mountain), an ideality (a geometric theorem), a person (a colleague), or an imaginary transcendence (Frodo's ring), their meaning of being (*Sein-Sinn*) «constitutes» itself within the syntheses of consciousness, in connection with an intentional operative life. Insofar as every being is significant, it is «constituted», that is, it manifests itself in its being and being-as-such (*So-Sein*), within passive and active syntheses. By means of a systematic analysis on constitutive intentionality, Husserl aimed at understanding the transcendence and the complex structure of the world: which intentional operations are necessarily implied in the manifestation of the different kinds of objects? Nevertheless, the intentional constitution has nothing to do with the ontological dependence of the world on subjective or intersubjective conceptual schemes: its constitution pertains to its manifestation, its appearance and significativity. Husserl conceived phenomenology not as an attempt to dismiss realism, but rather as an account of the realism of natural attitude. Phenomenology explores the meaning of being of the world, constantly given in our experience.

Keywords: Intentionality; Constitution; Realism.

Wouter Goris, **Das historische Apriori bei Husserl und Foucault – Zur philosophischen Relevanz eines Leitbegriffs der historischen Epistemologie**

Abstract: Die philosophische Relevanz des Quasi-Oxymorons eines historischen Apriori wird in diesem Beitrag, im Rückgang zu seinen direkten Ursprüngen bei Husserl und Foucault, erschlossen durch Erstellung zweier Serien, in welchen der Husserlsche und der Foucaultsche Begriff jeweils einen Gegenbegriff erhalten: objektives bzw. formales Apriori. In Kritik an eine vereinfachende Deutung des Verhältnisses zwischen dem Husserlschen und dem Foucaultschen Begriff des historischen Apriori, die das historische Apriori Husserls mit dem formalen Apriori Foucaults identifiziert, werden ein kritischer und ein therapeutischer Aspekt des Begriffs unterschieden. Zwar verhindern die Pluralität und Historizität des Begriffs vom historischen Apriori bei Foucault eine therapeutische Rückkehr zur ursprünglichen Evidenz, doch unterschreibt er mit Husserl unvermindert den kritischen Aspekt einer Befreiung von der Unterschiebung epistemologischer Konstrukte für das historische Apriori. Erst die Anerkennung, daß sich der Begriff des historischen Apriori bei Husserl und Foucault unter Abgrenzung von einem ihm unterschobenen Begriff des Apriori definiert, enthüllt das Programm der Kritik einer solchen Unterschiebung, das im Begriff des historischen Apriori beschlossen liegt und das die philosophische Relevanz dieses Leitbegriffs der historischen Epistemologie ausmacht.

This contribution deals with the quasi-oxymoron of a historical a priori, as it was originally conceived by Edmund Husserl and, later, by Michel Foucault. It wants to discover the relevance of this historical a priori by setting up two series of opposites: namely, one in which the concept is contrasted with the objective a priori as in Husserl and the other in which it is contrasted with the formal a priori as in Foucault. Now some interpretations identify Husserl's concept of the historical a priori with Foucault's concept of the formal a priori. In criticism of such a simplifying identification, this contribution makes a distinction between a critical and a therapeutic aspect of the historical a priori. The plurality and historicity of this concept in Foucault does certainly prevent a return to its original evidence. Nevertheless, Foucault fully endorses with Husserl the critical aspect by which this historical a priori is freed from the subreptitious substitution by epistemological constructs. Only when it is recognized that the concept of the historical a priori is defined in Husserl as well as in Foucault in contradistinction to a subreptitiously substituted concept of the a priori, will the program of a critique of such a subreption, which is enclosed in the concept of the historical a priori, be disclosed. This program constitutes the philosophical relevance of the historical a priori as a guiding concept of historical epistemology.

Key words: Historical a priori; Edmund Husserl; Michel Foucault; Formal a priori; Historical Epistemology

Miguel García-Valdecasas, **Wittgenstein on Intentionality and Representation**

Abstract: Wittgenstein's concept of intentionality is strongly connected with his views on language and thinking. Although his views progressively developed over time, Wittgenstein came to realise that intentionality is a property of thought that can only be accounted for in the context of ordinary language. On this basis, the view of intentionality that regards it as a natural property, or as a scientifically examinable property that can be found in the natural world is hostage to a number of paradoxes, some of which are discussed here. His atomistic view of language and reality heavily weighed on his earlier conviction that the analysis of the processes of thinking would inevitably provide a central key to intentionality. This analysis regarded thinking as a mental process with undefined and elusive features. Wittgenstein soon realised that this view was the result of unchecked prejudices, and that unless language is regarded as a capacity of thinking, and thinking as an inherently representative capacity of humans that use language in the context of language-games, intentionality will remain unknown. This article provides evidence to understand why Wittgenstein thinks this way.

Key words: Wittgenstein; Intentionality; Representation; Mental States; Language-games.

Oscar Barroso Fernández, **Actualidad e intencionalidad en Zubiri**

Abstract: The present paper inquires into the dialogue between Zubiri and phenomenology through the analysis of the particular problem of intentionality. The early writings of the Spanish philosopher show that Zubiri believes that the overcoming of idealism is possible if Husserlian phenomenology is understood as objectivistic. However, in the mature writings, due to the influence of philosophy of Ortega and Heidegger, he undertakes the analysis of a great field unexplored by his masters, that is, of the reality understood as the actuality. It's not a flight to a shelter of classical realism, but rather an attempt to radicalize the phenomenological analysis, so that the intentionality could be ultimately founded on the basis of actuality. In this way, although the intentionality plays no role in the most radical field of the sentient intelligence, it is nevertheless required to act in the sphere of logos.

Key words: Phenomenology; Intentionality; Actuality; Reality; Zubiri; Husserl.

Elisabetta Sacchi / Alberto Voltolini, **To Think Is to Literally Have Something in One's Thought**

Abstract: In this paper, we first want to defend the idea that reference intentionality is the relation of constitution holding between an intentional state, a thought, and the object it is about, its intentional object. As such, reference intentionality is for a thought an essential property, whose predication to that thought is true in virtue of the nature of such a thought. We will take this to be one of the main lessons of serious externalism, according to which the intentional object occurs in the individuation conditions of the thought about it. Moreover, we want to draw some consequences of this idea. First, in conformity with serious externalism we will claim that an objectual thought is nothing but its intentional object in a cogitative modality, which is nothing but a certain motivational role for that object to play with respect to a subject. Second, we will claim that one such thought, both as a type and as a token, is an abstract particular, respectively a kind and a relational trope.

Key words: Intentionality; Constitution; Intentional Objects; Motivational Roles; Objectual Thoughts; Tropes.

Stefania Scardicchio, **Idealism, New-Realism and Pragmatism: The American Debate on Reality from Royce to Lewis**

Abstract: In the first decades of the twentieth century new realistic tendencies arose in the United States as a reaction to the idealism dominating American academia. The foremost idealist at that time was Josiah Royce and the first realistic tendency against his idealism was directed by Ralph B. Perry and William P. Montague. In 1910 they promoted the manifesto of the American new realism.
In this paper I offer an analysis of the debate that led to the birth of the new realism: it will provide a different perspective on the history of American philosophy and will open new reflections on the impact of the debate.
In this debate "reality" was faced as an epistemological issue rather than an ontological one: the origin of this trend was an ambiguity in Royce's work. Although initially new realists moved on the ground prepared by Royce, later they attempted to release the notion of reality from epistemology and to return it to metaphysics, claiming the priority of logic in both fields. However, the trend was definitively established by Clarence I. Lewis – a student of Royce and Perry at Harvard – who considered reality as the problem of the categories we use to speak correctly about our experience of the world. He established the rule that would be followed by the next generation of philosophers.

Key words: Constructive Idealism; New Realism; Reality; Experience; Categories; Given.

Paolo Pecere, **Naturalizing Intentionality between Philosophy and Brain Science. A Survey of Methodological and Metaphysical Issues (1969-2011)**

Abstract: To give an account of intentionality in terms of the concepts and methods of natural science has been considered as a crucial step towards a naturalization of mental phenomena in general, and as such it has been pursued by a large number of naturalist philosophers and cognitive scientists. Starting from the late 1960s the problem has been addressed in very different, reductionist (Dennett,

Millikan: § 2) and antireductionist ways (e.g. Searle, Chalmers, Putnam: § 3). The development of these philosophical programs has benefited from the contemporary technical and theoretical progresses of neuroscience, and leading scientists such as Changeux, Edelman and Damasio have presented articulated proposals of naturalization of intentionality (§ 4). A common element of philosophical investigations turns out to be the reference to a still undeveloped neuroscientific theory. This reference belongs to the legacy of early XXth century anti-metaphysical "scientific philosophy". In spite of this dominant philosophical approach, neuroscientists present their pioneering researches on intentionality with the help of metaphysical frameworks of the past, including Aristotelianism, materialism, emergentism and Spinozism. The final section of the paper examines this peculiar "paradox" of naturalization programs, by considering some critical exchanges about the neurobiological approach (§ 5) and by reviewing the role of metaphysical paradigms for different approaches to this issue (§ 6).

Key words: Naturalism; Intentionality; Neuroscience; Reductionism; Metaphysics.

Maurizio Ferraris, **Responses to *Quaestio***

Abstract: In this article I wish to illustrate realism's position with regard to modern and contemporary philosophy and its transcendental turn. I will posit that new realism, while being very well aware of this turn (followed in particular by postmodern thinkers), rejects it: in fact, from a realist perspective, the existence of ancestral beings, existing long before humans, proves that reality cannot be regarded as a correlate of human thought. I will therefore respectively refute the theories positing the dependency of reality on thought, arguing that the main problem with anti-realism stems from a twofold confusion: between ontology and epistemology on one side, and between natural objects and social objects on the other. Finally, I will dwell on the perspectives which today lie in the proposal of a positive realism.

Key words: New Realism; Postmodernism; Ontology; Social Ontology; Epistemology; Contemporary Philosophy.

Mario De Caro, **The Two Faces of Realism**

Abstract: According to some philosophers, philosophical realism is an obsolete, specious and irrelevant conceptio. In this essay I argue that this thesis is deeply flawed because the issue of realism is philosophically inescapable. Then I discuss two versions of philosophical realism that are particularly widespread today: common sense realism and scientific realism. These conceptions tend to be hegemonic, and consequently often in conflict with each other. The biggest challenge for philosophical realism over the next few years will be to try and harmonize them.

Key words: Realism; Naturalism; Common Sense.

Costantino Esposito, **Truth without Certainty? An Open Question into New Realism**

Abstract: The paper aims at reopening a relevant issue into the actual debate about the 'new realism', with its critical taking distance from 'hermeneutical' perspective of the postmodernism. Against the predominance of the interpretations and socio-cultural constructions of the reality, the new realism strongly underlines the objective 'truth' of the world in its not amendable ontological character with respect to conceptual patterns of epistemology. This 'return' to the truth takes its distances from the experience of 'certainty', still seen as a pre-theoretical way, like a subjective faith as access to reality. Here, instead, I try to demonstrate the essential nexus occurring between truth and certainty, the last one intended as the necessary assent which allows us to perceive the true as it is, also through referring to some crucial moments within history of philosophy (from Augustine to Descartes, from Thomas Aquinas to Husserl, from Newman to Wittgenstein). In other words, it is about focusing on the very concept of reality as relationship between the 'I' and the world, between real data and our interpretations, avoiding that the firsts could be merely intended in an objectivist sense and the seconds left to the field of bare subjectivity.

Key words: Realism; New Realism; Postmodernism; Truth; Certainty; Facts; Interpretations; Assent; Augustine; René Descartes; Gotthold Ephraim Lessing; Thomas Aquinas; Edmund Husserl; Hans Urs von Balthasar; John Henry Newman.

Matteo Morganti, **New Realism and Scientific Realism**

Abstract: The recent 'new realist' wave in philosophy reacts to the postmodernist/deconstructivist rejection of the notions of truth and objectivity by (re)affirming the priority of the real over the subjective and socially constructed. Crucial in this dynamics is, among other things, the refusal of the anti-scientific stance integral to the non-realist view. In light of this, it is advisable to look at the new realism vs. antirealism debate from the perspective of the seemingly more local dispute concerning *scientific* realism vs. antirealism. Indeed, doing this enables one to exploit elements that are peculiar to the discussion concerning the epistemic content of scientific theories with a view to properly evaluating, and even clarifying and further articulating, the 'new realist' stance itself.

Keywords: Realism; New Realism; Scientific Realism; (Constructive) Empiricism; Truth; Objectivity; Construction.

Andrea Sereni, **Mathematical Realism: What's New?**

Abstract: The recent debate on new realism has been widely influenced by Putnam's views, especially by the distinction between scientific realism and natural or common seense realism. I locate the discussion on mathematical realism in the context of this wider debate. I suggest that a parallel distinction between science-based arguments for realism and more immediate forms of realism is avaiable for mathematics too. I point to differences between contemporary empiricist and intellectualist positions, and stress what I take to be some of the most relevant aspects on which research in this area shall be pursued in the near future, especially concerning the problem of whether philosophical priority should be given to pure or applied mathematics.

Key words: Mathematical Realism; Indispensability; Explanation; Naturalism; Anti-Empiricism.

Marienza Benedetto, **Da Atene a Baghdad (e oltre). Ancora sul rapporto tra filosofia araba ed eredità greca**

Abstract: The recent publication of volumes about Arabic science and philosophy allows us to revisit one of the most fascinating phenomenon of the whole intellectual history – that of *translatio studiorum* from Athens to Baghdad, and from Baghdad to the Latin West, analyzed here through the particular lens of Avicenna's metaphysics and psycology and al-Fārābī's cosmology. The result is a clearer understanding of how Avicennian and Farabian thought creatively transformed Greek legacy to estabilish a new paradigm in the history of science and philosophy.

Key words: *Translatio studiorum*; Arabic Science and Philosophy; Ibn Sīnā; 'Eastern' Philosophy; al-Fārābī; Cosmology.

Bernd Goehring, **Henry of Ghent on Human Knowledge and Its Limits**

Abstract: In this essay I present Henry of Ghent's account of human knowledge, which is grounded in Henry's notion of the human function. Henry of Ghent explicates the human function, i.e. exercising the natural, rational capacities of our mind, in terms of our cognitive assimilation to objects of cognition. In the ideal case of the beatific vision a created mind is presented with its perfect object, which completes our mental capacities all at once. By contrast, our acquisition of knowledge in this life is characterized by the mind's rational, discursive activity and has to be considered as an approximation to this ideal case. In particular, human cognition is realized through our specific capacities – our senses, memory, imagination, intellect and so on. That we are cognizers set up in this way has implications for the scope of our cognition and the content of our representations: we have a limited perspective on the world. While the world is presented to us in manifold ways, Henry seeks to understand how we come to cognize things in their essential structures. His account of representation and knowledge is thus guided by his desire to explain how our conceptual content captures not only what is true of a given thing here and now, but, more importantly, what is always true of it, in terms of its nature. According to Henry, God directs all human cognitive activity through our natural capacities and provides exemplary standards as a regulating influence in human cognition, as a kind of corrective, conceptual matrix that structures our perspective on the world. I argue that in order to understand both the fundamentals and the development of Henry's views on human knowledge we have to take into account redactional stages in Henry's writings, as revealed in Gordon Wilson's critical edition of Henry's *Summa*, art. I-V. The redactional stages in Henry's text do not show the alleged waning importance of divine illumination in Henry's mature thought (as supposed by many critics), but rather a movement in the opposite direction: they confirm Henry's strengthening of the role that this divine, regulating influence has even in cases of ordinary human cognition.

Key words: Henry of Ghent; Augustine; Divine Illumination; Human Cognition; Intentionality; Mental Representation; Philosophy of Mind; Theory of Knowledge.