

René Lefebvre

Aristote : ce qu'il y a et ce dont on parle au vu de *Métaphysique Zêta*

Abstract: On the background of the later opposition between realism and anti-realism, and with special attention to the overlapping of reality and *logos*, an examination of Aristotle's way of answering to the what there is question in *Metaphysics Z* (= VII), with its numerous paradigmatic examples (musical, you, whiteness, surface, white surface, man, white man, nose, concavity, snubness, concave nose, snub nose, concave nose nose, circle, bronze circle, statue, flesh of man, finger, two-footed animal...) and its network of concepts such as being, actuality, substance, *ti en einai*, form, matter (sensible or intelligible), universal, individual, compound (particular or universal), substrate, attribute (accidental or *kath'hauto*), part (of matter or of form), definition and others.

David Lefebvre

Energeia et *entelekheia* chez Théophraste

Abstract: This study explores Theophrastus' uses of two Aristotelian key concepts, *energeia* and *entelekheia*. Texts from the *De causis plantarum* come first into discussion. There, Theophrastus gives a kinetic meaning to *energeia* and reduces its teleological engagement, as it can be shown also through a close reading of the fr. 176 FHS&G. Then, in the physical fragments (fr. 152 FHS&G) and in Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*, we focus on the relationship between *energeia* and change. The connection between the "Passage" (to use Burnyeat's word) and Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* is object to some scrutiny. It appears that these texts reveal Theophrastus' own difficulties to choose between two alternative conceptions of *energeia*: the analogical unity used by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* IX 6 and the opposition between *energeia* and change. To a large extent, Theophrastus' *aporiai* on this subject express the Aristotelian heritage.

Anca Vasiliu

Penser la réalité / Réalité de la pensée entre l'acte et la puissance (Aristote, Plotin, Marius Victorinus)

Abstract: In the Ancient world, the notion of reality was conceived either as the concept of "substance" (*ousia*) or that of "action" (*energeia*) which actualizes, effects or accomplishes as an object (*ergon*) the substantial or essential nature of a being. According to the particular relations of eminence or determination put up between action and power, the reality of an object originates in the object itself within the accomplishment that determines its specific identity, or is given by the possibility of thinking and knowing the object in the whole of its power and actuality, i.e. as an object whose reality does not depend on the immediate actuality of its accomplishment as a specific object. The relations between thought (*noêsis*) and thinkable (*noêton*) that Plotinus defines against the Aristotelian eminence of action (as reality) over power (as possibility), and the reversal of the relation of perfection between action and power formulated by Marius Victorinus within the framework of the intra-trinitarian links between common substance and individual being-existing, reveal a cleft within the conception of the reality of a being. That cleft is inherited from Platonism as much as from the Aristotelian conception of the two *ousiai*, and will be reflected in mediaeval thinking in terms of the opposition between realism and nominalism.

Laurent Lavaud

Deux métaphysiques hors-sujet : la conception plotinienne de l'*ousia* intelligible (*Traité 43* [VI, 2]) et son influence sur saint Augustin

Abstract: Two competitive models are alternatively present in plotinian metaphysics. In the first one, the intelligible *ousia* appears to be the substrate or matter of its different determinations. In the second, Plotinus abolishes all exteriority between the *ousia* and its acts, *energeiai*, which are Forms. In this second perspective, the *ousia* is the generative principle of its own constitution : any idea of substrate or matter must henceforth be banished from the intelligible realm. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the influence of this second model on the psychology and theology of Augustine. More precisely, the augustinian theory of the mutual immanence of the three divine Persons could have its origin in the plotinian ontology.

Kristell Trego

Ce qui se trouve là et ce qui est fait. Le nom de l'être et la réception d'Aristote dans la *falsafa*

Abstract: In his *Kitab al-huruf*, al-Fârâbî exposed a problem: Arabic language doesn't have a word corresponding to the Greek verb *einai*. This paper examines the way Arabic philosophers managed to practice metaphysics. First, we consider Fârâbî's interpretation of the use of *al-mawjûd*, and his explanations concerning the key-words of metaphysics. After the pronoun *huwa*, translators have used the words *wujûd* and *mawjûd*. The verb *wajada* means: "to find". So, being (*to on*) is understood as "what is found". Secondly, we consider Avicenna's metaphysics, and his understanding of reality.

Olivier Boulnois

L'invention de la réalité

Abstract: Generally attributed to Duns Scotus, as the correlate of formal distinction, and as the minimal component of being, the concept of reality is older than that. It arose during the twelfth century, under the name of *realitas*, probably by Odo of Tournai, in order to designate what was created from nothing; soon after, William of Liege uses it to designate a plan of unity in God, within his triplicity. But

it was Henri de Ghent, at the end of the 13th century, who made it a fundamental metaphysical concept, which designates the tenuous community of the various objects signified by categories, and the possibility of the created being, independently of its existence. In short, the concept of *realitas* realizes the leveling of all things (real or imaginary, categorial or transcendental), in all that is not nothing: the reduction of being to essence, and of essence to reality.

Francesco Marrone

Ens reale / Ens rationis. Le mental et le réel dans le formalisme scotiste du XVI^e siècle

Abstract: This paper focuses on the formulation of the concept of ‘reality’ between the XV and the XVI centuries by investigating the classification of being of reason and its distinction from real being in the scotistic tradition. The paper is divided into three main parts. Firstly, it shows how the notions of reality and existence cease to coincide. Secondly, it aims at highlighting the importance of the notion of *esse obiectivum* within the frame of the late scholastic thought. Thirdly, it demonstrates how the late scholastic theory of being of reason allows to better understand the relation between the ‘mental’ and the ‘real’ at the dawn of the modern age. The authors considered are Antonio Trombetta, Francesco d’Arezzo, Jean Du Douet.

Jean-Christophe Bardout

Note sur les significations cartésiennes de la réalité

Abstract: As a brief lexical analysis shows us, Descartes elaborated two concepts of reality (*realitas*, *réalité*). His first concept of reality, mainly thematised in *Meditation V*, is rather traditional: reality is understood as an object of thought; thus, mathematical objects are the «true and immutable natures». His second concept of reality occurs in *Meditation III*, with the formal or objective reality; in such a context, reality (formal reality as much as objective reality) depends upon an efficient cause, and for this reason is properly a being. Such an account concerning reality gives rise to a new question: if reality means a kind of being, how does reality distinguish itself from existence? The paper aims at elucidating how Descartes answered this question. Unlike reality, existence admits no degree. Certainly, reality isn’t existence. Nevertheless, reality is understood in the framework of a metaphysics for which existence is the first meaning of being.

Vincent Carraud

Des choses réelles à la réalité des choses

Abstract: Focusing on Descartes’ striking phrase “real things” in *Discours de la methode*, and on the one of “reality of things” written by Pascal in his *Pensées*, this paper aims to shed light on Cartesian concept of reality by specifying how this term “real” relates to other concepts (in particular: imaginable, created, and existing), and by explaining that having a clear and distinct idea of one thing is precisely what gives it to be real: the reality of the object of thought has to be deduced from its truth. Such explanation enlightens the very example of reality of space, as the phrase “reality of things” comes from Cartesian demonstration of its limitlessness: through such understanding, Pascalian words, in *Disporportion of man*, paradoxically, take into account – and accept – the new meaning of reality.

Arnaud Pelletier

The estimation of reality. Variety, change and order of the real according to Leibniz

Abstract: G.W. Leibniz addresses the issue of reality in different ways according to the objects that are considered. One way relates to the characterisation of mental contents (*realitas*), another to the distinction between real (*realia*) and imaginary phenomena, and a third one to the real foundation of phenomena in things (*res*). But in all those reflections, as diverse as they are, Leibniz constantly refers the same set of criteria in order to ‘estimate’ reality, namely: by considering its variety, its change and its order. This article examines various instances of what Leibniz himself calls the ‘estimation of reality’.

François Pépin

L’actualité de l’énergie dans le matérialisme des Lumières

Abstract: During the French Enlightenment, materialists considered the “énergie” from a new and interesting way. Dealing with new philosophical and scientific issues, they were ones of the first philosophers to distinguish clearly energy from the ancient idea of *energeia*. Energy does no longer refer to the “act” or to the final state of a process, but includes two main states, one potential, and one actual. In particular, energy refers to natural powers and the way they act through various degrees or ways. From a materialist point of view, it is thus tempting to assume a link between energy and matter. But this link is subtle and opens an interesting series of questions. First, for materialists such as Diderot, La Mettrie and d’Holbach, it is not relevant to frame a metaphysical definition of matter, and then to ask if and how energy can be a property related to the essence of matter, should it be extension or something else. The construction of the concept of matter must follow another course which integrates empirical and scientific determinations, in particular chemical relations and forces. Second, in particular in Diderot’s thought, matter tends to be redefined by energy. Matter does not have (some) energy as a property deducible from its unique essence, it is rather a heterogeneous substance always acting and expressing its power through different degrees of actualization. Energy tends to be reality itself – a material reality made of plural substances always interacting in various ways.

Costantino Esposito
L'impensé de l'existence : Kant et la scolastique

Abstract: The paper aims to follow the hidden traces of Francisco Suárez' metaphysics (esp. his notions of "ens", *essentia realis* and "existence") in Immanuel Kant's theory of "being" not intended as a "real predicate", but rather as the "simple position of a thing". The Author will underline the influence of the ontological-transcendental heritage arising from a very "dogmatic" work (so it would be defined by Kant) as the *Metaphysical Disputations* (1597) of Suárez – and thanks to the mediation of Christian Wolff's *Philosophia prima sive Ontologia* (1729) and Alexander G. Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (1739) – on the critical-transcendental theses of some anti-dogmatic works of Kant, like *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763), the *Critique of pure Reason* (1781) and the *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion* (1783/84). In both Suárez and Kant, starting from different contexts and working in different perspectives, the datum of existence tends to be identified with *what exists*; more precisely, with the fact that something is produced by a cause (Suárez) or in the fact that something is part of our category of causality (Kant). This common decision concerning the sense of "existing" is certainly made to safeguard the fact of existing as different from what we think a priori by way of concepts alone. Yet in both cases the price to pay is too high. Because the fact of existing becomes even more the existence of a thing which only tell us about itself as a coming-out or an exit from causes, in which the surplus of being or the mystery of provenance is almost totally reduced to the constitution of a mere product, namely the production of God or of the function of our understanding.

Catherine Colliot-Thélène
Ce que réalité veut dire

Abstract: "Reality" is not a category listed in Hegel's *Logic*. Hegel is distrustful of the ordinary uses of this term, linked to the empiricist presupposition of a dependence of thought on the given of sensible intuition. As far as philosophy is concerned with understanding the very act of thinking, what Hegel calls "the logic", it can only be idealistic. Speculative philosophy accomplishes what was the project of transcendental philosophy, delivering it from the ultimate concessions to empiricism that are the "thing in itself" in Kant or the "shock" of the No-Self on the ego in Fichte. However, it finds reality again, not in the form of the inexhaustible diversity of the sensible, but as a thoughtful intelligence of the rational.

Dominique Pradelle
Réalité effective et ancrage phénoménologique des modalités

Abstract: The concept of possibility has an essential function within Husserlian phenomenology. Firstly Husserlian phenomenology is an eidetical one, which is based on a subjective relation towards mere possibilities; secondly phenomenological reduction reduces all effective objects to mere possible objects of thought; thirdly the thesis of transcendental idealism implies a supremacy of possible sense over reality; and each type of transcendental constitution presupposes an "I can", that is a practical possibility or capacity of the subject. This paper wants to focus the way on which Husserl conceives a concept of possibility which is different from the Aristotelian concept of *δύναμις*, from the Leibnizian conception of the being of possible worlds and from the Kantian conception of the possible as a modality of subjective knowledge: where does possibility have to be situated, on the subjective or objective level? And in which domain do modalities have their origin: in the subjective sphere of stands, in the ideal sphere of propositions, in the ontical sphere of objects of possible experience, or in the noetical and antepredicative sphere of modalisations of perceptive belief?

Emmanuel Cattin
La fin de la réalité

Abstract: This contribution studies the German translations for reality: *Realität*, *Sachheit*, *Wirklichkeit*, first in their own ambiguity, then at the end of the hegelian *Objective Logic* in *The Science of Logic*, where *Wirklichkeit* is in a way the last name for *Sein*, finally in Heidegger's last thought, through the *Contributions to philosophy* and conferences at the end of the *Nietzschebuch*. The end of metaphysics appears as the end of "reality", when reality is itself the end.

Barbara Stiegler
Flux et Réalité. Une lecture croisée de Nietzsche et Bergson

Abstract: At first glance, Nietzsche and Bergson appear wholly opposed. Where the former pulls back the veil of all so-called reality to reveal the fictional constructions our bodily needs cast as what is real, the latter's ambition is to return to a reality lost, the reality that precedes the "subjugation" of our experience by the "necessities of corporal life". Where Nietzsche takes philosophy towards the living body, almost to the point that the latter becomes a cage, Bergson gives his utmost for philosophy to be freed from the flesh. The present contribution, however, aims to demonstrate that, beyond this conflict, Nietzsche and Bergson nevertheless stand together behind one shared affirmation: reality just is flux. What remains then to be understood is why, from a shared interpretation of the real, they choose these two opposing directions. And why this divergence leads them to two opposing visions of metaphysics, one proclaiming its demise (Nietzsche), the other its true beginning (Bergson).

Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim
L'actualité est-elle vraiment indexicale ?

Abstract: The common wisdom, among philosophers of language and metaphysicians of analytic tradition, is that though only actual things exist, 'being actual' and its cognates do not ascribe a special feature by which *actualia* would differ in ontological kind from mere *possibilia*. They are conceived of, rather, as indexicals expressing nothing but the point of view of a subject on his surroundings. The indexical analysis of actuality owes much of its appeal to two influent arguments put forward by David Lewis, respectively the argument from knowledge of our own actuality and the argument from the contingency of actuality. In this paper, I offer an alternative account on which 'the actual word' is a non-indexical and non-rigid definite description that expresses the absolute property of being actualized. I show that, pace Lewis, the absolute concept of actuality is better suited than its rival to meet the challenge of the contingency and knowledge arguments. In particular, the absolute concept provides a simpler explanation of the various uses, rigid as well as non-rigid, of 'actually' and related expressions, while avoiding the paradoxical consequences induced by the indexical concept.

Pascal Ludwig
Sur quoi les hallucinations portent-elles ?

Abstract: This paper aims at reconciling direct realism on the one hand, that is, the thesis according to which perceptual experiences disclose perceptible facts, with intentionalism, the view that sensory experiences represent the world as being a certain way. I argue that intentionalism is compatible with the claim that veridical sensory experiences and hallucinations have different objects. Whereas veridical experiences typically have contextual perceptual objects, the existent objects they are "about", hallucinations are "directed" to objects that end up non existing in a context of perception. This is consistent, I claim, with the view that sensory experiences are powers to acquire knowledge. In favorable situations, these powers give rise to perceptual relation with existing objects, but they may also be actualized in unfavorable contexts. I tentatively suggest that the contents of such "failed" experiences are non-propositional.

Paul Richard Blum
In fugam vacui – Avoiding the Void in Baroque Thought

Abstract: The era of the Baroque witnessed a fierce debate over the interpretation of some experiments about the vacuum. It was riddled with fear of annihilation. My focus will not lie on the development of science but on the strategies to avoid or justify or 'fill' the vacuum and the conceptual strategies used, not only in natural philosophy but also in literature and the arts. With John Milton it will be understandable that deep theological issues were having a psychological effect, since hell was equivalent with emptiness. The various physical experiments yielded scientific theories that dispelled the fear connected with the acceptance of a vacuum. One way suggested to think of vacuum as a fundamental force in the world. With growing terminological sophistication vacuum lost its horror. On the other hand the imagination of the void lead to the artistic representation of death. Thus I hope to establish that *fuga vacui* was, indeed, a signature of baroque ways of thinking.

Davide Cellamare
Confessional Science and Organisation of Disciplines: Anatomy, Psychology, and Anthropology Between the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth Centuries

Abstract: In this article I address the introduction of anatomy in books on the soul that were produced in sixteenth-century Germany and the Low Countries, by authors such as Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), Bruno Seidel (1530-1591), Rudolph Snellius (1546-1613), and Otto Casmann (1562-1607). I explain that this transformation in the Renaissance *scientia de anima* brought about novel conceptions of man's body and soul. I show that, on the one hand, a particular use of anatomy was first made by Philip Melanchthon, in his *Commentarius de anima* (1540) and *Liber de anima* (1552): the Lutheran reformer used anatomical knowledge as part of his efforts to produce an educational system that would enforce religious and political order within the Lutheran camp. On the other hand, I argue, the conception of the human nature ensuing from Melanchthon's works was remoulded at the hand of his followers into an anthropology that could be used across confessional groups and independently of its initial religious motives.

Stefano Di Bella
Un razionalismo barocco? Spunti per una lettura leibniziana

Abstract: "Baroque" sensitivity – a concept elusive enough – develops in the complex post-Renaissance culture and largely co-exists with the new culture shaped by seventeenth-century scientific revolution. In Leibniz's experience a totally "modern" exploration of the new world mixes with the adoption of rhetorical tools and spiritual attitudes typical of baroque culture. I present here some samples of this Leibnizian approach, where some central themes of the new science and new philosophy (mechanism, representation, the issue of the sense of reality) are reinterpreted within an original practice of re-enchanting and theatricalizing of world.

Sandro R. D'Onofrio

Las enseñanzas acerca del ente de razón según el Padre José de Aguilar, S.J.

Abstract: In his explanation of the nature of the being of reason, Fr. José de Aguilar, S.J. (1652-1708) presents a notion of «objective concept» which is common to both known real beings and beings of reason. Although he distinguishes both types of concepts according to how they relate to reality, he considers them ontologically equal. However, Aguilar claims that these concepts are also a certain entity related to the general concept of being presented in his metaphysics. This way he not only distances himself from his coreligionist Francisco Suárez, but presents an original way of conceiving reality, based on the mental ontology of objective concepts.

Ofer Gal

Etica barocca. Spinoza e la caduta della ragione

Abstract: “Desire is the very essence of man” Spinoza says, inverting a most deeply held conviction: that in our “very essence” we are “mind, reason and judgment”. The ethical implications are difficult: only “through fear society can be established [...] not by reason [...] but by *threats*”. Yet Spinoza explores these implications mercilessly, reversing the roles of reason and passions: instead of subjecting the unruly passions to reason’s knowledge of true and good, Spinoza entrusts the passions, as causal conduits of natural order, with controlling the selfish and idiosyncratic reason. The paper follows Spinoza’s motivations and resources for this reversal.

Manuel Lázaro Pulido

Iluminar las ciencias desde el arte general del saber: la nueva enciclopedia barroca de Sebastián Izquierdo

Abstracts: Sebastián Izquierdo represents the last version of the Spanish philosophical baroque defined by scholasticism renewal and the dialogue with Early Modernity. One of the signs of this baroque characterization is the encyclopaedic thought represented by the *Pharus Scientiarum* of the Spanish Jesuit Sebastian Izquierdo. This paper shows the concepts presents on Spanish baroque encyclopaedic context: perspective, regards, and new light... And also the encyclopaedic role of *Pharus Scientiarum*: memory, Lullism encyclopaedia, Imperial College of Madrid... *Pharus Scientiarum* is the last opportunity to guide Modernity to the second navigation from philosophical tradition presents at university chairs of XVI century

Gabriella Zuccolin

Two Heads Two Souls? Conjoined Twins in Theological *Quodlibeta* (1270 - c. 1310)

Abstract: This article focuses on the case of conjoined twins in a selection of quodlibetal questions by John Peckham, Henry of Ghent, Remigius dei Girolami and John of Naples, in a period of time between the last three decades of the 13th century and the first decade of the 14th. The theological and philosophical starting assumptions appear rather different: if for Peckham all the weight falls on the question of the correctness of the baptismal formulas, Henry is interested in the question of the uniqueness or plurality of the substantial forms in the human compound, Remigius in the hierarchy of the organs, and John in the correspondence between the organs on one side, and between body and soul (as a consequence) on the other. Analogously, as for the conclusions, Peckham, Henry and John of Naples believe – albeit in different ways – that where there are two heads we must presuppose two souls; Remigius has a few more hesitations, granting the possibility that two heads (of unequal capacity and perfection) may correspond to one heart, and therefore to one soul, and above all assuming that where there are two heads, two hearts and two distinct rational souls, one cannot speak of a single body that is truly continuous, but of two bodies welded in an extrinsic way. Particularly worthy of attention is Henry of Ghent’s approach, in which the exception of conjoined twins serves as a kind of anthropological experiment to confirm a doctrine – that of dimorphism – which applies to all human beings and represents the standard condition of humanity. Subverting at least partially the rules of medieval teratology, the *monstra* cease, at least in this case, to be simply anomalies or exceptions, and become instead explanatory phenomena indicating what is necessary in all other ‘normal’ human beings.

Carmino Di Martino

Per una genealogia della storia. Lettura “eretica” dei *Saggi eretici sulla filosofia della storia* di Jan Patočka

Abstract: The present article proposes a ‘heretic’ reading of Jan Patočka’s last work, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*, usually considered as a profound philosophical reflection upon the nihilistic outcome of Western civilization and upon its chances of rebirth. In contrast to this common interpretation, the author construes Patočka’s work as a possible genealogy of the West, of philosophy, and of history itself in its most proper sense. On the one hand, the present work sheds some light on the analyses Patočka employs to reconstruct the origin of Western culture; especially, it underlines the decisive importance attributed to the birth of politics in the Greek experience of the *polis*, seen as a threshold from which philosophy itself can be established. On the other hand, it problematizes the very core of Patočka’s genealogical gesture, its conditions of possibility, as well as the blend of empirical and transcendental, of archaeology and teleology, which characterizes it. Finally, the author discusses the limits of Patočka’s reference to the political life to explain the philosophical gaze and discourse, and argues about the necessity of calling upon a change of the ways in which knowledge constitutes itself in relationship to the Greek revolution of writing.

Andrea Sebastiano Staiti

Ethical Validity and Its Ontological Bearer in Heinrich Rickert's Metaethics

Abstract: In this paper I present Heinrich Rickert's account of the difference between theoretical and ethical values as an insightful strategy to accommodate constructivist and realistic intuitions in metaethics. After situating Rickert's work in the Neo-Kantian philosophy of value stemming from Lotze I discuss the distinction of psychological act, realized good, and corresponding value in both the theoretical and the ethical domain. I then introduce Rickert's account of autonomy as the fundamental ethical value and the distinction between encompassing and pervasive values. I conclude with the distinction between the ephemeral ontological bearers of ethical value (actions) and the robust ontological bearers of theoretical value (configurations of meaning or *Sinngebilde*) and argue that this distinction grounds the distinction between pervasive and encompassing values previously introduced.