

Christoph Rapp  
Aristotle on Things and Super-Things,

*Abstract:* Does Aristotle's terminology provide some guidance when we inquire into the origins of the notion of thing? Naturally, one might think of Aristotle's notion of being, which is meant to capture everything that is. However, 'being' in Aristotle seems to be significantly broader than what we take to be a 'thing'. I will take up a thesis introduced and defended by Rainer-Wolfgang Mann, namely that Aristotle is actually the inventor of the notion of thing in that his *Categories* conceptualized the distinction between properties on the one hand and their bearers, individual substances, on the other. It will be argued though that Aristotle, when conceptualizing things as bearers of properties, depicts a notion that is actually stronger than what we usually mean by 'thing'.

Fosca Mariani Zini  
Les droits des choses. Remarques sénéquénnes sur ce qui est, ce qui *quasi est*, ce qui n'est pas

*Abstract:* Often, when Seneca wants to defend a thesis that seems original to him in relation to the Stoic school, he claims to enjoy distracting himself with subtle games that quickly become boring puzzles. This article would like to show how Seneca, especially in letters 58, 113, 117, but also in his other writings, establishes the meaning of what is, what is not and what is *quasi*. The goal is important, since Seneca seeks to give incorporeal things, *lekta*, a power of action that they should not have, because only bodies can act. Seneca's solution remains problematic. However, Seneca finds its original conceptual features in the highly abstract and fictional thinking of Roman law, particularly in the reflection on the meaning of *res*.

Giovanni Catapano  
'Cose' e 'signi' secondo Agostino

*Abstract:* This article analyzes the definition of *res* in two places of Augustine's works, namely, *De dialectica*, ch. 5, and *De doctrina christiana*, I, ii, 2. In these places, the concept of *res* is treated in relation to the concept of sign (*signum*). In the first text, Augustine suggests that with our words we mean things by expressing ideas of those things. According to the second text, something is a thing only insofar as it is not being used currently as a sign, given that anything can be used as a sign.

Pasquale Porro  
Il *De quiditate et esse* attribuito ad Alberto Magno. Una nota sulle origini della distinzione tra *res a reor reris* e *res a ratitudine*

*Abstract:* Among the various questions on different subjects attributed to Albert the Great, and presumably disputed in Paris around the middle of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, we find one – handed down mainly under the title *De quiditate et esse* – dedicated to the presentation of some fundamental notions of metaphysics. This particular question deserves attention insofar as it represents a significant moment in the genealogy of the distinction between the notions of *res a ratitudine* and *res a reor reris*. A final remark concerns the possible connection between Albert the Great and Henry of Ghent with respect to the transcendental primacy of *res* and the attempt not to reduce the consideration of metaphysics to actual being alone.

Francesco Marrone  
*Res e Realitas*. Enrico di Gand e il vocabolario della cosa

*Abstract:* This paper aims at investigating the vocabulary of thingness in the thought of Henry of Ghent. The paper features two main parts: in the first part we try to clarify the statement and the implications of the distinction between the concept of *res a reor, reris* and the concept of *res a ratitudine*. On the subject the thesis argued that this distinction has essentially an epistemological function in Henry of Ghent's thought. The second part of the paper, instead, takes into consideration the concept of *realitas* as it is formulated by Henry in some sections of his *Quodlibeta*. The argued thesis is that *realitas* is not a synonym of being, but rather designates the inner foundation of every ontological attribution.

Alessandro D. Conti  
Essence in the Late Middle Ages: the Case of Walter Burley. From Moderate to 'Platonic' Realism

*Abstract:* Apart from the opposite semantic attitudes, the main difference between Late Medieval Realists and Nominalists lies in the antithetic evaluation of the nature and ontological status of essences. In the article a very interesting example of the medieval realist approach to the problem of essence, that of Walter Burley, is discussed. Because of Ockham's criticisms of the traditional realist conceptions, Burley's ontological convictions evolved over the years from a quite original version of the moderate realism inspired by Averroes's doctrine on essence, to the radical (and somehow Platonic) form of realism proper to his final theories.

Igor Agostini

I significati di *res* nella metafisica di Descartes

*Abstract:* This article inquires into the concept of *res* in the Cartesian metaphysics. It argues, on the one hand, that *res* should not be interpreted in line with the traditional scholastic concept of *substratum*, and on the other hand, that it is nevertheless a technical notion. In particular, the determination of the ego as *res cogitans* in Descartes' Second Meditation (AT VII 27) must be interpreted in the light of the ontology of the *veræ naturæ* of the Fifth Meditation. The subsistence of the ego is indeed grounded on the criterion of identification of the true natures, that is on the inseparability of concepts. The ontology of the *veræ naturæ* is therefore already at work both in the Second and in the Third Meditation before becoming explicit in the Fifth Meditation.

Vincent Carraud / Gilles Olivo

*Ens reale*. Note sur deux réponses de Descartes à Burman

*Abstract:* The *Conversation* that Descartes had with Burman on April 16, 1648 sheds light on the meaning of the phrase *ens reale*, which was common in modern scholastic treatises but unusual under his pen, and thus on the Cartesian concept of *realitas*. *Ens verum et reale*, such is the object of mathematics: no less real than that of physics, even if it does not exist out of the mind and requires imagination. As for the object of metaphysics, if it is no less real than that of physics and mathematics, it is both existent and unimaginable. The answers given by Descartes that are examined here are significant samples which in addition show the need to re-edit the *Conversation* in the light of Clauberg's *Opera*.

Gilles Olivo

De Dieu à la nature : Pascal et "la réalité des choses"

*Abstract:* In the *Pensées*, Pascal uses the astonishing phrase "the reality of things" to designate, not the actual existence of things, but the being-thing of all things (in accordance with the meaning of the Latin *realitas rerum*). It will be established that with this phrase, although it is of Cartesian origin, the analysis of "Disproportion of Man" aims at a criticism of the Cartesian *ratio formalis infiniti sive infinitas*, which Pascal shows not to be suitable to think God, but only to describe and name nature as the totality of thinkable objects.

Pina Totaro

*Res* in Spinoza

*Abstract:* The article analyzes the different occurrences of the term *res* present in Spinoza's works in their relations with other terms (*ens*, *idea*, *perfectio*, etc.) and particular phrases (*res cogitans*, *res extensa*, etc.). It is shown how the treatment of the concept of *res* is closely connected to the reflection on the notion of *causa* and *substantia* and its epistemological value is defined in the context of the distinction between different kinds of knowledge: imagination and intellect. With the first kind of knowledge the *res* is anchored to external causes and to confused and fortuitous sensations of the body, while only the intellect allows the knowledge of the *res* as *substantia*, as *causa sui* and cause of all things. In this horizon, which is epistemological, ontological and ethic, the knowledge of the *res* coincides with the knowledge of ourselves, of God and of things.

Stefano Di Bella

La *res* e i termini. Leibniz e la questione della cosa: tra semantica e ontologia

*Abstract:* Leibniz's treatment of the concept of *res* should be considered in the context of his semantic-ontological reflections on the relationship of language, thought and reality, profoundly shaped by a nominalistically minded deflationary approach. In this paper I consider (a) the role of *res* as a kind of super-category and its relationship with *ens*; then I pass to consider the narrower usage of *res* to designate a concrete item, in the sense (b) of a subject of inherence as opposed to properties, and (c) of an object as opposed to a concept.

Jean-Christophe Bardout

L'idée comme chose. L'immatérialisme de Berkeley

*Abstract:* This paper aims at questioning Berkeley's formula: «I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things» (*Three Dialogues*). It shows that the identification of ideas with things is a consequence of immaterialism and constitutes a decisive element in the fight against scepticism. The very being of the thing is now decided on the basis of thought. Berkeley is often presented as a thinker who breaks with the philosophers before him. If this view is right, it is also incomplete. We show that the identification of the idea with the real thing represents the culmination of speculations born during the Middle Ages, and repeated in cartesianism itself.

Francesco Valerio Tommasi

La costituzione 'pragmatica' della realtà in Kant

*Abstract:* Two terms in the Kantian lexicon derive from the Latin metaphysical tradition of the *res*: *Realität* (Reality) and *Wirklichkeit*

(Actuality or Effectiveness). The first one expresses one of the categories of quality and in the Kantian table it corresponds to affirmative judgements. The second one represents the scheme of the modal category of existence (*Dasein*), that is – according to Kant’s words – «existence in a determinate time». It is worth notice that *Realität* has no proper scheme and it rather seems to express the general functioning of schematism: that is, the «realization» of categories. To be able to function and to apply to phenomena, in fact, categories must be restricted and adapted to the forms of sensibility. Schemes can therefore be interpreted as plastic and pragmatic functions and «reality» in its broader sense and in its general meaning can be understood as the product of this operations. This interpretation can be confirmed by following the main arguments of the early debate on the «thing-in-itself» among the first Kantian scholars. But this interpretation may be confirmed by a yet unknown possible source of the Kantian doctrine of schematism: the architectural treatise by Leonhard Christoph Sturm. In those pages, the *idea materialis* is the plastic figure used by architects as a model for a construction. And the tradition of the *idea materialis* is an important reference for the development of the Kantian Schematism.

Emmanuel Cattin

*Unwesen. Hegel et la chose*

*Abstract:* This contribution studies the thing in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, its strange mode of presence, its consistency and dispartition by itself, its confusion. The concept of property or quality is here the main one, with the concept of plurality of things. But there is another glance over things, as Hegelian *Aesthetics* will show it: the thing such as Dutch painters have seen et shown it for the first time.

Adriano Ardovino

La nozione di ‘cosa’ in *Essere e tempo* di Heidegger

*Abstract:* The article analyzes the notion of thing in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. Although Heidegger will deepen its potential only from the mid-30s, even making it a pivotal concept of his later thought, that notion plays an important role already in the discourse of fundamental ontology. Far from being a limit, the phenomenological ambivalence of the thing is a crucial resource, which makes it a truly rich and articulated ‘operator’ in *Being and Time*.

Paolo Ponzio

*Cosa-sentido e cosa-realidad. Xavier Zubiri e la meta-fisica della realtà*

*Abstract:* The intent we propose will be to retrace a few fundamental passages of the philosophical and metaphysical thought of the Spanish philosopher, considering two conceptual pairs that refer to the question of *res-realitas*: constitutive respective / remittent respective, *cosa-realidad* / *cosa-sentido*.

Mario De Caro

The Historical Roots of the Fracture between Subjective and Objective Realism

*Abstract:* The article discusses the origin of the split between common sense and the scientific view of the world, which took place at the beginning of the modern age. More specifically, it shows how Galileo was able to address the two main objections against his mathematically-based scientific realism: that mathematics can not be applied to the material world (since it only works for idealized entities) and that physics is only a useful tool for making predictions, but it does not really describe the natural world nor explain it. Galileo was able to counter those objections, but he did not win his other battle, i.e., to show that the common sense view of the world, based on the idea of the reliability of perception, is illusory. A battle that has not been won by his contemporary followers – (the advocates of scientific naturalism) either.

Erik Åkerlund

Suárez and the Metaphysics of Democracy

*Abstract:* The nature and essence of democracy is a bigger issue today than it has been for a long time. With (clearly and allegedly) populist movements in Western Europe and the US, the question of what constitutes democracy has become a contentious issue, though often treated only implicitly. In this article, the nature and essence of democracy is treated with Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) as a guide. This is done on the background of his general metaphysics. It is concluded that Suárez’s political philosophy can be called democratic, as political power comes from and ultimately rests with “the people”, according to him. The right balance between “people”, in the plural, and “the people”, in the singular, cannot be calculated, though. On the background of the treatment of Suárez’s political philosophy, some conclusions regarding how best to uphold and strengthen democracy are drawn.

Jean-François Courtine

Droit naturel et droit des nations de Thomas d’Aquin à Suárez

*Abstract:* Starting from the classical distinctions proposed by Thomas Aquinas (lex aeterna, natural law, people’s law), we examine how

the discovery of the New World and the Spanish Conquest led Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suárez to redefine the notions of political communities by laying the foundations of international public law.

Costantino Esposito

Una volontà senza libertà? Sulla natura della *potestas divina* e della *potestas humana* in Francisco Suárez

*Abstract:* This paper focuses on the nature and origin of “potestas”, both human and divine, in the context of Francisco Suárez’s *De legibus*. On the basis of a presentation of Suárez’s juridical system – which takes into account the three levels of eternal and positive divine law, natural law, and positive human law – the link between *lex* and *potestas* is investigated within the framework of *ius naturale*, *ius gentium*, *ius civile* and *ius canonicum*. At all levels of law, the legislator’s will (understood as command and obligation) has a constitutive function. In the purely natural (or moral) juridical order, as well as in the customs of the people and, a fortiori, in the political community, it emerges a concept of the will which is paradoxically detached from freedom, in the perspective of both God as legislator and the commanding principle of a body politic directed at the common good. The foundation of legal obligation in the *potestas divina* leads Suárez to identify the freedom of the individuals within the *corpus mysticum politicum* with the principle of obligation belonging to the natural reason of the political community. As a result, it is precisely in the relationship between divine and human power advocated by Suárez that we can observe the reduction of ontological participation to a pure natural function of obligation.

Rosanna Finamore

La *potestas humana* ricondotta alla *potestas divina*. Vincoli e libertà del soggetto agente in Francisco Suárez

*Abstract:* To read the relationship between *potestas divina* and *potestas humana* in a simple ontological hierarchy would lead to not understanding the multiple meanings that they entail on the theological, metaphysical, anthropological, ethical, juridical and political levels, and which are instead present in the works of F. Suárez. With an epistemological focus, the article analyzes suárezian speculative and theoretical choices in arguing the human condition and in constantly relating it to cooperation with God. In Suárez there is the full appreciation of the human faculties of creature, who desires and loves, and who has received from the Divine Legislator the source of the most profound freedom, that is the *potestas humana*. At the same time, there is an enhancement of every entity, finite or infinite; the only adequate analogy is that of intrinsic attribution. For *potestas divina*, God is *Dominus*; for *potestas humana*, *vir* and *foemina* are *dominus* and *domina*, capable of governing himself/herself, of living righteously in the community, of welcoming and sharing the charity that is of God.

Thomas Pink

Suárez on Authority as Coercitive Teacher

*Abstract:* Does Suárez’s view that political authority rests on consent or agreement make him a herald of modern contractarian theories of the state, as Quentin Skinner has argued? Or does Suárez have a fundamentally different conception of political authority? The paper will argue the latter. Modern theories of coercive authority view it as a product of human artifice, with the functions both of facilitating cooperation through coordination and of threatening sanction to contain ill will. For Suárez, by contrast, coercive authority is divinely instituted, in various ways, and has the further function of enabling the proper human exercise of or response to forms of power that are not ordinary causation. In particular coercive authority acts as a channel and teacher for forms of power that are normative – that constitute various forms of the power of truth or of goodness. Coercive authority exists at the natural level as the authority of the state, channeling the power of natural reason in relation to the good of a community, and at the supernatural level as the authority of the Church channeling the power of grace. Central to the functioning of authority at both the natural and supernatural levels is the coercive direction of belief. This is a conception of authority that is very alien to modern political theory – thanks, in large part, to the influence of Hobbes.

Franco Todescan

*Praeceptum iustum ac stabile, sufficienter promulgatum*. Dogmatica giuridica e suggestioni teologiche nel «sistema delle fonti» di Francisco Suárez

*Abstract:* This essay is drawn up to represent Francisco Suárez’s system of laws. The civil law is mainly founded on the legislator’s will, but this law must also be fair. The law of nations is divided into a *ius inter gentes* which is in force among different nations and a *ius intra gentes* based on the civil law which is common to different nations. The natural law is based on the knowledge of rules in conformity with human nature. The eternal law, in the end, is the model (*exemplar*) by which God created the universe.

Giovanni Ventimiglia

Aquinas on Being: One, Two or Three Senses of Being?

*Abstract:* In this article I point out that rather than two, as is commonly thought, or indeed one, which is an old idea recently revived by some scholars, Aquinas in fact presents three main senses of being: (A1) being as *actus essendi* or *esse* or ‘present actuality’; (A2) being as (real) form or essence; (B) being as the reply to the *an sit?* (is there...?) question or *anitas* or ‘there is’ sense. Regarding the relations among these three senses of being I show that: (i) the same logical treatment holds for the form (B) and (A2), since both can and need to

be re-written in the form: something is so-and-so (whereas the same process cannot be applied to the A1 sense of being); (ii) the relation between the A1 and A2 senses of being is not a mere relation between distinct elements, but rather a relation among different stages of a single process, namely that between first and second actuality; (iii) the relation between the A (1 and 2) and B senses of being seems to be one of grounding, since the 'there is' sense seems to Aquinas to be grounded on the present actuality sense of being as an effect to its cause.

Mario Loconsole

New Trends in Eckhart Studies

*Abstract:* This contribution focuses on some of the latest advances in Eckhart Studies concerning the German sermons, the edition of the *Quaestiones Parisienses* and the dating of the *Opus tripartitum*. Though not addressed by Josef Quint's edition, the liturgical order of the German sermons has been gaining prominence, shading new light on their interpretation: in this respect, considering the order of the medieval Dominican liturgy enables to approach the communicative circumstances of the sermons doing justice to Eckhart's homiletic effort. Moreover, four new *Quaestiones Parisienses* collected in the *Codex Vaticanus latinus* 1086 have been recently reconsidered, providing evidence about the attribution to the Dominican master. Lastly, due to the re-examination of the Cod. Amplon. F 181, the recent suggestions for backdating the *Opus tripartitum* reveal a different overview of Eckhart's intellectual activity.

Alfredo Gatto

Descartes and the Coimbra Commentaries: A Critical Source of the Cartesian *Meditations*

*Abstract:* This article aims to present the Coimbra Commentaries as a critical source of the Cartesian *Meditations*. The *Cursus Conimbricensis* played an important role in shaping the philosophical pedagogy of the seventeenth century, and many modern scholars were formed through the pages of these volumes. Although we do not know for sure whether the Coimbra Commentaries were used as textbooks in La Flèche, there are solid reasons for believing that, when Descartes refers to the possibility of divine deception in the first meditation, he is using some examples taken from the *Commentary on Physics* written by Manuel de Góis.

Antonio Lombardi

Una via italiana alla metafisica? Dall'ontologismo al neoparmenidismo

*Abstract:* The attention paid to Italian philosophy in the recent historiographical and theoretical debate is constantly increasing: therefore it becomes necessary understanding first of all if there is such a thing as 'Italian Thought' and, if so, establishing in what it would consist. Critically resuming the claims of Bertrando Spaventa and Pantaleo Carabellese, according to whom Italian philosophers had anticipated since from Renaissance the revolutionary intimacy between being and thinking (ontologism), which later triumphed thanks to German Idealism; the aim of the article is showing how this original unity is marked by a connotative metaphysical aptitude. Although during 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries this long 'Italian way to metaphysics' led also to antithetical results (such as in the case of Bontadini's theism and of Severino's neo-parmenidism) it doesn't lose its trademark. This could represent a possible exegetical alternative to see in the so-named 'Italian Thought' not only a political and anti-systematic soul.