

Julie Brumberg-Chaumont, *'Logica hominis in via'*: anthropologie, philosophie et pratiques de la logique chez Gilles de Rome

Abstract: The paper wishes to investigate the way Giles of Rome thought about logic: as a discipline, as a method, through an examination of the powers of logic, but also as a teaching subject. It tries to illuminate his views on logical education, and how he may have acted in favour of the latter as an Augustinian leader. It first offers a general presentation of the logical productions, from the 1270s to 1291. It then addresses the topic of logical education from two viewpoints: by a look taken at Giles' views on logic in the *De regimine principum*, and by a quick survey of the history of the teaching of logic in the *studia* of the Augustinian order from the mid-1280s on. The last section is dedicated to the philosophy and anthropology of logic. It tries to enlighten the originality of Giles' s position, as a new departure taken from traditional theories regarding the absolute necessity of logic as a science, as an art, and as the underlying logic of all sciences, itself included. Rather than essentially necessary for any kind of philosophical endeavour, logic is presented as a need for men, due to the fallible nature of his potential intellect. Rather than a science, it is described as a method for science which doesn't use its more powerful instrument, *i.e.* the theory of scientific syllogism, since it proceeds in a non-demonstrative manner in the theory of demonstration. Logic and metaphysics are compared as respectively under and above special sciences. The last paragraph deals with the problem of the powers of logic in the context of metaphysical knowledge.

Irène Rosier-Catach, Gilles de Rome et les modes de parler angéliques

Abstract: In the *De cognitione angelorum* (1287-88) and then in the *Ordinatio* (after 1309), Gilles of Rome dedicates long chapters to angelic language (*locutio angelica*). His starting point is a question from Thomas Aquinas about the "secrets of hearts" (*occulta cordium*): they can only be known through corporeal signs, which unwillingly manifest them. Gilles uses Thomas's postulate that the acts of will are not visible to others, to reject his definition of speaking as a thought voluntarily conveyed to others, and generalizes from his answer: thoughts need to be made manifest through a sign. He develops a theory describing the different types of signs according to their addressees (an angel's speech to God, to himself, to another angel, to a man), and analyses them according to several criteria. In particular, from a careful analysis of the signs used by men, Gilles wonders whether the different types of signs used both by men and angels are natural or voluntary, from the point of view of both their composition and their meaning, basing his questioning on the reflections on language and signs in his earlier philosophical commentaries. This insistence on the need for signs will lead Gilles to give different answers to the classic questions about the difference between thought and language, the possibility of addressing a particular angel, and lying.

Costantino Marmo, Giles of Rome and the Modists on Signification and Language

Abstract: Giles of Rome developed his personal positions about signification in general and linguistic signification discussing contemporary and immediately preceding authors' views, such as Robert Kilwardby's, Albert the Great's and probably various authors of the Modistic milieu. In this article, Giles' positions on signs and linguistic signification will be shortly described, his discussions about homonymy will be linked to contemporary debates, and finally some of Giles' positions that were discussed, criticized and sometimes misunderstood by later Modists, such as Simon of Faversham, the Anonymous of Prague and Radulphus Brito, in their commentaries on the *Sophistical Refutations* around the end of XIIIth century, will be commented upon.

Catherine König-Pralong, Épistémologie déflationniste et théologie universitaire selon Gilles de Rome

Abstract: This paper addresses the conception of theology developed by Giles of Rome from the *Reportatio* of his lecture on the second book of the Sentences (1271) to his fifth *Quodlibet* (1290). It demonstrates that, from the beginning of his career, Giles discredited the power of philosophical reason in the realm of theology, a discipline which he conceived as a defensive, rhetorical and exegetical practice. Henry of Ghent was the principal adversary attacked by Giles, who challenged the scientific legitimacy of theology which Henry, after Thomas Aquinas, had established as the highest speculative discipline. In the conclusion, the paper highlights strong similarities between Giles' theological epistemology and Godfrey of Fontaines' conception and practices of university sciences.

Cecilia Trifogli, Giles of Rome on Sense Perception

Abstract: Giles of Rome maintains that the senses are passive powers and more specifically receptive powers, that is, powers to receive something from sensible objects. The items that the senses receive from sensible objects are (sensible) intentional species of the corresponding sensible forms. This paper deals with Giles's account of the cognitive role of intentional species in sense perception. The central question is how the intentional species of red received in the eyes is related to the act of seeing a red apple. Is such a species the act itself of seeing a red apple or rather something distinct from the act and causally related to it? And in the latter case, what kind of causality is involved? We shall see that Giles changed his mind on this subject, so that we have an early view and a mature view. His early view (found in his commentary on *De anima*) is that the intentional species is distinct from the corresponding sensory act and a cause of it, more precisely a formal cause. His mature view (found in *De cognitione angelorum*) is that (i) in the case of the external senses the intentional species is the same as the sensory act itself, whereas (ii) in the case of the internal senses two kinds of intentional species are involved, that is, that which is the same as the sensory act and another one that acts as a proxy for the sensible object.

Richard Cross, *Pro Insipiente*: Giles of Rome on Modes

Abstract: Giles of Rome systematically distinguishes two kinds of modes, which in this essay are labelled 'conjunction modes' and 'category modes'. The latter – according to which a substance might have the mode of an accident (as in Christ's dependent human nature), and an accident the mode of a substance (as in the Eucharist) – are ontologically innocent, and predications about them are parasitic on conjunction modes. Conjunction modes are features of the universe, and are deposited in their subjects by things united to but really distinct from their subjects. For example, a quantity-thing, united to a substance, deposits a quantity-mode in the substance;

and an existence-thing, united to a particular essence, deposits an existence-mode in the essence. In this essay, some attempt is made to defend this view against objections raised by Ockham.

Emmanuel Brochier, Le problème de l'éternité du monde chez Gilles de Rome dans les limites des deux rédactions de son commentaire de *Sent. II* (dist. 1)

Abstract : Does the second writing of the commentary on PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sent. II* (dist. 1) by Giles of Rome constitute a break compared to the first writing? The accurate comparison of the problem of the temporal beginning of the world and its treatment – where *Reportatio* and *Ordinatio* take the shape of a commentary on *Phys.*, VIII, 1 – shows that the presence of Thomas Aquinas is even stronger after 1277. Refusing Aristotle's and "modern" theologians' arguments, in *Ordinatio* in continuity with *Reportatio* Giles advocates a philosophical position in favor of the temporal beginning of the world – theoretically possible though not given – as opposed to Thomas' standard position, but not to his argumentation in THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In VIII Phys.*, 2.

Valérie Cordonier, Aristotle Theologized: the Importance of Giles of Rome's *Sententia de bona fortuna* to Late Medieval and Renaissance Peripatetism

Abstract: This paper highlights the decisive role played in the longer course of Aristotelian tradition by Giles' *Sententia de bona fortuna*, a work that constitutes a telling example of the radical transformations imposed by Latin thinkers on the Aristotelian philosophical system. The impact of this commentary was decisive for the subsequent discussions on fortune, contingency and "divine government" – that is, the issue of how God, as the First Principle of all beings, leads them all to their ends or their ultimate "good". In so doing, the article shows that Giles' reading of the Aristotelian treatise called *Liber de bona fortuna* marked the birth of a coherent 'natural theology' in the Latin West.

Marialucrezia Leone, Did Giles of Rome Change His Mind Concerning Will and Intellect?

Abstract: In Giles of Rome, moral responsibility and human freedom are articulated taking into account the relation of will and intellect. For Giles, this topic appears to be particularly crucial and often recurs in his texts over the course of his career. According to some scholars, reacting to the academic and ecclesiastic circumstances (e.g., his condemnation in 1277 and his rehabilitation in 1285), Giles increasingly favored the autonomy of the will in his ethics. That is to say, taking its starting point from an "intellectualistic interpretation" of the relation of the faculties of the soul, the Augustinian *magister* changed his mind after his rehabilitation, placing more importance on the volitional faculty. To the contrary, I shall point out that in his ethics certain consistencies can be observed that emerge in all his works. The aim of the article is to investigate whether Giles reconsidered his earlier opinion regarding moral responsibility.

Gianluca Briguglia, Note su nobiltà e cortesia nel *De regimine principum* di Egidio Romano

Abstract: The article focuses on the twofold-nobility idea, a nobility of conduct and line, starting from some brief comments by Brunetto Latini, Thomas Aquinas and a more explicit formulation by Henry of Ghent. Then it focuses on the usage of this double notion in the *De regimine principum* by Giles of Rome and on how, through this couple, particularly in the vernaculars, it leads to the creation of a new political space for thinking nobility and courtesy.

Roberto Lambertini, *Et omnia possidentes*: proprietà e povertà nel *De ecclesiastica potestate* di Egidio Romano

Abstract: Studying Giles of Rome's *De ecclesiastica potestate*, scholars usually focus their attention on the first part, where the Augustinian master argues in favor of his extreme theory of papal power. The present paper deals with the second part of the treatise, devoted to the relationship between the Church and temporal possessions. The main issues discussed in this part are therefore not political and ecclesiastical power, but ownership and poverty. The paper underlines in the first place the connection existing between Giles of Rome's treatment of these problems and the controversy between Secular and Mendicant clergy. Although originally a mendicant friar himself, Giles tries to avoid any interpretation of mendicant poverty that could undermine the right of the Church to exercise lordship over temporal goods. In the second place, the paper shows how Giles' account of the origin of private poverty is functional to his claim that the Church possesses all rights on temporal goods at the highest level. In this way, the Church is the sole authority that can grant a right of property, so that every human being depends on the Church also for his legitimate possession of temporal goods.

Jean-Luc Solère, Giles of Rome on the Intensification of Forms

Abstract: On the question of the *intensio/remissio formarum*, Giles, while sharing Thomas Aquinas's view's main tenets, develops a very different theory – in fact, a theory that is unique, and deeply "aegidian": the increase or decrease does not take place in the essence of a qualitative form, but only in its *esse*, in function of the disposition of the subject that receives this form. Giles's position, however, may be threatened by a risk of infinite regress in the conditions that explain the receptivity of a subject. He successfully addresses this issue, and, within the framework of Aristotelian physics, offers a very original response: qualitative changes in bodies are ultimately based, via condensation and rarefaction, on the spatial positions of their material parts.

Fabrizio Amerini, Substance, Accidents and Definition in Giles of Rome's *Quaestiones metaphisicales*

Abstract: Scholars paid scant attention to Giles of Rome's *Quaestiones methaphisicales*. This is due to many reasons. The *Quaestiones* are likely the first of the Aristotelian commentaries written by Giles and all XVI-century printed editions conserve but a *reportatio* of the course on *Metaphysics* that Giles probably gave in Paris between 1268/1269 and 1271. Since Giles never edited the text of his lectures,

we cannot be sure that Giles approved the list and the contents of the questions we may read today. Moreover, the current list is also incomplete because a study of cross-references in Giles' Aristotelian commentaries (Donati 1990) showed that Giles wrote other questions, not included in the list we have today. Despite of these features, Giles' *Quaestiones* are import both historically and philosophically. They contribute to fixing the chronology of Giles' first works and to illustrating the metaphysics of the early Giles. In particular, a close examination of the questions on Books VII and VIII of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, devoted to substance and accidents, shows various things. For example, the influence exerted by Averroes's Commentary on Giles's teaching and, accordingly, the pivotal role played by the notion of definition in the explanation of the essence of substance and accidents. More generally, such an examination permits us bringing to light the exegetical devices Giles used in order to reconcile Thomas Aquinas's view of the primacy and unicity of substantial form (a thesis that Giles, albeit with some hesitations, maintains across his career) with his idiomatic position that indeterminate dimensions m

Francesco Marrone, La determinazione del soggetto della metafisica nelle *Questiones metaphysicales* di Egidio Romano

Abstract: Giles of Rome's *Questiones metaphysicales* present a substantial discussion of the so-called *quaestio de subiecto metaphysicae*. This paper aims at reconstructing some relevant aspects of this discussion in an attempt to emphasize the originality of Giles' thought. Often considered as an epigone of Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome is instead a very competent and original author: on the one hand, he masterfully handles Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and its main interpretations; on the other hand, he provides original solutions about some aporetic aspects of the Aristotelian thought. From a theoretical point of view, Egidio elaborates an overall interpretation of metaphysics capable of ensuring both its thematic unity and the ontological difference existing between its objects.

Marienza Benedetto, A Case of *re-translatio studiorum*: the Jewish Reception of Giles of Rome from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance

Abstract: From the beginning of the XIV century, many leading works by Latin scholars were translated into Hebrew only a few years after being written. This practice reveals the extraordinary process of philosophical re-acculturation that has its roots in precise ideological and social reasons: implementing contemporary Latin culture rapidly and systematically meant, for late Medieval Hebrew translators, renewing Hebrew wisdom in the light of their Christian neighbours' thought.

This was certainly the purpose of one of the protagonists of Hebrew Scholasticism, Yehudah ben Moses Romano: openly hostile to the philosophical inertia of his Jewish contemporaries, who were still convinced of being the sole holders of the truth bestowed on them from on high, he translated for his co-religionists new knowledge from his Christian colleagues.

Particularly intense and sustained were the translations he made of Giles of Rome, which display transversal interests in all aspects of his work (from logic and rhetoric to physics, ethics, psychology and metaphysics).

The history of the reception and success of Giles of Rome's thought on the Jewish world goes far beyond Yehudah Romano's intellectual project: the reference here is to Yoseph Taitazak (1480-1545 circa), who from his home in Salonica wrote the *Porat Yosef*, a bizarre Commentary on *Ecclesiastes*, in which Koholet's words are used as an occasion for Taitazak to reinterpret the Aristotelian system through a Thomist and Aegidian lens. The inclusion of the Scholastic doctrine in Taitazak's Commentary on *Ecclesiastes*, however, responds to a need symmetrically specular to the work of Yehudah Romano: not to proceed with a project of updating Hebrew culture, but to show instead how the Torah is the repository of all knowledge, indeed that the Torah is the knowledge.

Pasquale Porro, Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana e l'«averroismo di san Tommaso». Qualche considerazione sul senso e sulla storia della distinzione reale tra essere ed essenza

Abstract: Taking its cue from the famous articles in which the Jesuit Marcel Chossat, in the early decades of the last century, was the first to suggest that the doctrine of the real distinction between being and essence should be attributed to Giles of Rome, and not to Thomas Aquinas, the article proposes to consider the Neoplatonic matrix of Giles' distinction, and to re-examine in more detail the doctrine of participation, which is the real trigger of the controversy between Giles and Henry of Ghent. It suggests that Thomas Aquinas, Henry and Giles all three draw on the Proclean tradition (namely on Proclus' *Elementatio theologica*, and even more so on the *Liber de causis*), but each choosing different elements, as attested especially by the different readings of the fourth and ninth (in the Latin numeration) proposition of the *De causis*. Finally, it points out that the purpose of the distinction between being and essence is not at all, in Aquinas, to account for the contingency of creation (as it is in Giles of Rome, and as claimed by the Neothomists), but to highlight the superiority of God not only with respect to all that possesses matter, but also to all that possesses only a form, even if intrinsically necessary. The distance between Giles and Aquinas could not be greater in this respect: the Dominican Master is not at all interested in showing the radical contingency of all creatures, including separate substances. On the contrary, insofar as he defends the idea that separate substances, as pure forms, are inseparable from their being, it remains true that one could legitimately speak, with regard to this aspect, of "St Thomas' Averroism", as Chossat wanted.

Marilena Panarelli, How Do Plants Live and Grow? Radical Moisture and Digestion in Albert the Great's *De vegetabilibus*

Abstract: In his *De vegetabilibus* Albert the Great elaborates a complex physiological explanation in order to describe the vital functions of plants. This explanation is based on some relevant medical doctrines, such as that of radical moisture and digestion, which Albert translates from human into plant physiology. On the basis of these doctrines, Albert develops an intricate system of moistures, by means of which he detailedly explains the generation of each part of plants, such as the leaves, flowers and fruits. In this study, after briefly reconstructing the history of these doctrines, the main aspects of Albert's plant physiology will be analysed.

Mario Loconsole, A Theory on the Formation of Minerals. Albert the Great and the Constitution of Scientific Mineralogy

Abstract: In the early 1250's, Albert the Great wrote the *De mineralibus* to establish a mineralogical science based on Aristotelian epistemology. In the first instance, the Dominican master undertakes to clarify the proximal material and efficient causes of minerals. In his analysis, the examination of material causes proceeds through the evaluation of the Peripatetic and Arabic mineralogy, while the study of the efficient causes leads Albert to align the formative process of the mineral substances with the processes of the generation of animals and plants. Here the physiological role of heat acting upon moisture is crucial in the context of matter acquiring form. In contrast with the mineralogical tradition, Albert assigns the role of the efficient cause of stones and metals to heat, thus laying the foundation for a general theory of the process of generation. With respect to every degree of being, heat, on the one hand, is the active quality of matter, being able to act upon the elements; on the other hand, it conveys all the natural formative principles required for the formation of a substance.

Maria Evelina Malgieri, «Universale latissimae universalitatis»: origine della creazione e natura del *fluxus* nel *De causis* di Alberto

Abstract: Among the authors of the 13th century, Albert the Great is perhaps – together with Thomas Aquinas – the one who chose to confront more closely the metaphysical instances of the *Liber de causis*. The anonymous work, an original readaptation of Proclus' *Elementatio theologica*, not only found in Albert one of its most passionate interpreters, but also profoundly shaped his thought. It is difficult to establish whether it was more the *Liber de causis* that modelled Albert's philosophical and theological reflection, or Albert's reading of it that profoundly influenced the posterity of the *De causis*.

One of the best known aspects of Albert's thought is undoubtedly his metaphysics of flow, and more particularly his attempt to harmonise the Christian doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* with the Neoplatonic model of procession and emanation. In this article I jointly analyse: (i) Albert's definition of the flow; (ii) the way he describes the process of creation by the First Cause; (iii) the different definitions he offers of the first product of the First Cause. In this way, I hope to show that the nature of the flow – considered in its moment of origin (which coincides with the origin of the entire creation) – can be more adequately understood if considered in its relationship to that of the first created product, and vice versa.

Giuliano Mori, Truth, Verisimilitude and Criticism in Lorenzo Valla: Dialectics and Historiography

Abstract: This article analyses Valla's historiographical stance in the light of his dialectical assumptions about possibility, verisimilitude, and truth. I argue that, at variance with most humanists, Valla believed that historical truth should satisfy the requirements of logical necessity, being therefore incompatible with verisimilar reconstructions of past events. However, Valla also realized that a critical method of assessment grounded in verisimilitude was indispensable to the analysis of doubtful accounts and traditions. In order to explore these matters, Valla developed a genre distinct from history proper and closer to the forensic, inquisitorial tradition. While history had to deal with necessary truths, the aim of 'historical *inquisitio*' was to draw probable conclusions from pieces of conjectural evidence. According to Valla's dialectical principles, these conclusions were not absolutely true but could be considered true thanks to the notion of intellectual *acumen*, which allowed Valla to take a leap from the field of possibility or verisimilitude to that of truth and necessity.

Simone D'Agostino, Descartes epistemologo delle virtù: metodo e generosità

Abstract: Today some scholars consider Descartes a *virtue epistemologist*. In my paper, I examine this position, making a positive contribution to his claim. After (1) a brief clarifying premise about the meaning and scope of *virtue epistemology*, I present two major theoretical positions that argue, in a different way, that Descartes can be considered a virtue epistemologist: (2) that of Ernest Sosa, usually acknowledged as *virtue reliabilism*; (3) that of Richard Davies, more inclined towards a so called *responsibilist virtue epistemology*. Finally, (4) I deal myself directly with some specific Cartesian texts, especially from the *Discours de la methode*, in order to draw elements for strengthen and deepen the previous positions, thanks mostly to the passion virtue of *generosity*.

Márcio Suzuki, Com'è nata l'Estetica trascendentale di Kant?

Abstract: This article aims at reconstructing some of the conceptual premises that explain the origin of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetics, by focusing on Christian Wolff's synthesis of two different traditions. The first one is the new geometry of the situation created by Leibniz and the second one emerges from the metaphysics of the Spanish philosopher Francisco Suárez. Although Kant strongly criticizes Leibniz' and Wolff's 'intellectualism', his own conception of space and time would not have been possible without the transformation introduced by Wolff in the concepts of similarity, order, space and time.

Antonio Lombardi, Transcendentistic Trends in Italian Historiography of Metaphysics

Abstract: The article analyses and comments on the collective volume entitled *Storia della metafisica*, edited by Enrico Berti. The author goes through the various contributions dedicated to a prominent metaphysician or a metaphysic current and lets emerge the different recalibration experienced by the concepts of 'transcendence' and 'transcendental'. Berti's preliminary choice is indeed to include in a history of metaphysics only those metaphysicians who have considered transcendence particularly relevant in their philosophical enterprises. From this survey, it is possible to assert the good health of metaphysics in the contemporary Italian debate.